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Abstract:
The goal of the paper is to formulate a new conception of the naturalisation of 
law. I begin by highlighting the conceptual problems connected to the notion of 
naturalisation. I then proceed to describe and criticise three different approaches 
to the naturalisation project: separation, radical naturalisation and moderate nat-
uralisation. I argue that the theoretical problems surrounding these three views 
are so profound that a novel perspective on the naturalisation of law is needed. 
Finally, I try to provide such a perspective by formulating a theory which stresses 
that naturalisation is a matter-of-degree and that it is measured by the level of 
coherence between legal and scientific knowledge.
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Streszczenie:
Celem artykułu jest próba sformułowania nowej koncepcji naturalizacji prawa. W 
pierwszej części opisuję problemy pojęciowe związane z ideą naturalizacji. Następ-
nie przechodzę do opisu i krytyki trzech stanowisk odnośnie do naturalizacji prawa: 
separacji, radykalnej naturalizacji oraz umiarkowanej naturalizacji. Twierdzę, że pro-
blemy teoretyczne powiązane z tymi trzema koncepcjami są tak poważne, iż należy 
szukać innego, nowego spojrzenia na naturalizację prawa. Proponuję taką nową 
perspektywę formułując teorię, zgodnie z którą naturalizacja jest stopniowalna, a jej 
miarą jest poziom spójności pomiędzy wiedzą prawniczą i wiedzą naukową.
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On the naturalisation of law[1]
The problem of naturalisation has become a 
subject of heated philosophical debates in re-
cent years[2]. In this essay, I would like to present 
a proposal on how to understand the naturalisa-
tion of legal knowledge. I will, however, begin by 
presenting a controversy over the very concept 
of naturalisation (point 1). Then I will analyse 
and criticise three basic views on the problem of 
naturalisation, which I call separation (2), radical 
naturalisation (3) and moderate naturalisation (4). 
Finally, I shall point out an alternative concept, 
which is summarised in the thesis that the meas-
ure of the naturalisation of law is the degree of 
logical coherence of its descriptive presupposi-
tions with the findings of the natural sciences (5).
1. What is naturalisation?
The naturalisation of various branches of 
knowledge became popular with the publica-
tion of Willard Van Orman Quine’s ‘Epistemol-
ogy naturalised’ in 1969[3]. Since then, naturali-
sation of various philosophical disciplines has 
been considered - from aesthetics to the phi-
losophy of law. However, one can argue that 
the idea of naturalisation is as old as philoso-
phy itself: after all, the dispute between Plato 
and Aristotle can be seen as the first debate 
between an anti-naturalist and a naturalist.
Paradoxically, however, this fact does not make 
1The project has been financed by the National Science Centre 
under Decision No. DEC-2012/04 / A / HS5 / 00655.
2Cf. Leiter, B. Naturalizing Jurisprudence, Oxford 2007. 
3Quine, W.V.O. (1969) Epistemology Naturalized, in: idem, 
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York.
it easier for us to define naturalisation. From a 
general perspective, two types of naturalism can 
be distinguished, and thus two kinds of natu-
ralisation. Ontological naturalism is a thesis that 
‘reality has no place for ‘supernatural’ or other 
‘spooky’ kinds of entity’[4]; in this context, the 
naturalisation of epistemology, aesthetics or law 
would be to demonstrate that cognition, aes-
thetic values and legal norms are not ‘supernat-
ural’ phenomena. It is also clear that any practi-
cal application of this definition requires a prior 
definition of what are natural and supernatural 
phenomena. However, it turns out that this is 
not a simple task. For example, medieval think-
ers such as John Buridan believed that the term 
‘natural phenomenon’ refers to ‘the ordinary 
course of things,’ undisturbed by the miraculous 
interventions of God. But one who would think 
that Buridan’s understanding of ‘nature’ was 
similar to ours is wrong as for Buridan the struc-
ture of the ‘ordinary course of things’ included 
not only the laws of physics but also moral 
precepts[5]. In a more contemporary context, 
the term ‘natural’ includes beings that can be 
placed in space and time; one can also use it in 
a broader sense, including some emergent phe-
nomena. In this second view mental processes 
and in some conceptions also moral norms and 
mathematical objects are natural beings. 
Methodological naturalism, on the other hand, 
is the view that the scientific method is the 
only method we should use in our cognitive ef-
forts as it is incomparably more effective than 
any alternative[6]. Consequently, naturalisation 
4Papineau, D. Naturalism, in: The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), ed. E. N. Zalta, http://plato. 
stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/naturalism/.
5 Brożek, B. (2010) The Double Truth Controversy, Kraków, 
chapter 1.
6Papineau, D. Naturalism, op. cit. 
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in the methodological sense means applying 
scientific methods - and only them - to every 
problem encountered either in epistemology, 
aesthetics or law. Similarly, as in ontological 
naturalisation, in its methodological variation a 
lot will depend on how we understand the term 
‘scientific method’. The history of the twen-
tieth-century philosophy of science shows 
clearly that it is already difficult to define the 
method of physics; the more problematic is the 
definition of methods of biology, psychology or 
sociology, and these sciences can be relevant 
to the project of the naturalisation of episte-
mology, aesthetics or law. There simply is no 
clear criterion for distinguishing the ‘natural’ 
methods of psychology from the rules govern-
ing purely philosophical discourses[7].
All this makes the discussion of the problem 
of naturalisation of law (or another area of 
knowledge) very complicated, if not impos-
sible. The process of naturalising can be de-
fined in so many ways and possible definitions 
depend on the acceptance of so many onto-
logical and epistemological assumptions that 
the very concept of naturalisation becomes 
almost incomprehensible. In the face of these 
comments, it seems that alternative ways of 
understanding naturalisation need to be con-
sidered. My suggestion is as follows. Assum-
ing that at a given moment one can - more or 
less - compile a set of sentences that consti-
tute scientific knowledge (SK), there is a rela-
tion R between the SK and the knowledge of 
a given discipline DK (e.g. epistemology, aes-
thetics or law). The postulate of the naturalisa-
tion of a discipline D is reduced to the thesis 
that the relation R between DK and SK should 
assume a certain form. As I will argue below, 
proponents of radical naturalisation will claim 
7Hohol, M. (2012) Wyjaśnić umysł, Kraków.
that R is the material equivalence between DK 
and the corresponding fragment of SK (that is, 
DK is a subset of SK); moderate naturalisa-
tion recognises that there is a weaker logical 
relationship between DK and SK (for example, 
supervenience); and those who do not believe 
in the possibility of naturalisation will claim that 
there is no relation R between DK and SK. Let 
us illustrate these definitions with concrete 
examples. Since a proponent of radical natu-
ralisation of epistemology recognises that hu-
man cognitive processes, justification criteria 
and so forth can only be investigated by sci-
entific methods, then she recognises that the 
knowledge about human cognitive processes 
is a certain piece of scientific knowledge and 
nothing more. On the other hand, an advocate 
of the moderate concept of naturalisation of 
epistemology will argue that there are aspects 
of cognitive processes that can be directly 
studied by scientific methods, but there are 
also those that require philosophical meth-
ods (for example the problem of substantiat-
ing theorems), although the latter are related in 
various ways to the first type of issues; in other 
words, the moderate naturalisation of episte-
mology ultimately comes down to the thesis 
that the statements belonging to this discipline 
of knowledge are in a certain logical relation 
to scientific statements, but this is not always 
a material equivalence. Finally, an opponent 
of naturalisation will say that epistemological 
considerations are a priori in relation to all the 
findings of science, and therefore nothing a 
psychologist or a neurobiologist has to say can 
influence what standards we should use in our 
cognitive efforts.
From the foregoing considerations it follows 
that in order to speak about the naturalisation 
of law one must first characterise legal knowl-
edge (LK). The analysis of its structure I fol-
Pol Law Rev, 2017 Vol. 3 (1), p. 13-33
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 
DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0010.7840
On the naturalisation of law
16
low here is not necessarily complete, although 
I think that, given the purpose of this essay, it 
is sufficiently comprehensive. In my opinion, 
legal knowledge sensu stricto and sensu largo 
should be distinguished. The first includes le-
gal norms, judicial decisions and dogmatic and 
theoretical conceptions (including theories of 
the application of law and legal interpretation). 
In turn, legal knowledge sensu largo includes 
philosophical, psychological and sociological 
theories of law. The criterion for distinguishing 
between the two types of legal knowledge is 
the manner in which they are used in legal dis-
course. Laws, precedents, dogmatic theories 
and theoretical conceptions are directly appli-
cable in the process of applying the law, while 
philosophical, sociological and psychological 
theories are, in a sense, external to legal dis-
course: they may prove useful but are generally 
not used directly in legal argumentation.
It is noteworthy that legal knowledge sensu 
stricto is normative. Legal norms define what 
kinds of conduct are obligatory, prohibited, 
and permitted; judicial and other legal deci-
sions are individual-specific norms; dogmatic 
theories define how to interpret the law and 
how to solve actual or imagined legal cases; 
the status of the legal theory is more complex 
since it contains both normative and descrip-
tive constructs. I do not want to say that the 
‘ought’ involved in all these spheres of legal 
knowledge is the same. For example, it seems 
that the ‘ought’ imposed by the legal norms is, 
from an intuitive point of view, stronger than 
the obligation to interpret the rules according 
to some dogmatic theories. These differences, 
however, are not relevant to the thesis that 
what I call legal knowledge sensu stricto is of 
normative rather than descriptive character.
On the other hand, the legal knowledge sensu 
largo is mostly descriptive. This is certainly the 
case with sociological and psychological theo-
ries that relate to the practice of law. A bit more 
complicated is the case of the philosophy of 
law: models constructed on its ground can be 
both descriptive and normative. The question 
about the naturalisation of legal knowledge 
sensu largo can thus be answered as follows: 
sociological and psychological theories de-
scribing (explaining) legal practice are simply 
a part of scientific knowledge and, as such, 
are fully naturalised. The philosophy of law is a 
separate case, but it is part of the more general 
problem of the naturalisation of philosophy as 
such (a similar statement can be made about 
the theory of law, if these two domains can be 
distinguished at all). For this reason, I will only 
be interested in the question of the naturalisa-
tion of legal knowledge sensu stricto (with the 
exception of the theory of law). I will start with 
the question of the possibility of naturalising le-
gal norms, but in the last part of this essay I will 
postulate that other elements of legal knowl-
edge (court decisions and dogmatic theories) 
may also be subject to naturalisation.
2. Separation
Proponents of the separation of the factual and 
normative spheres claim that law cannot be 
naturalised, i.e. that there is no logical relation 
between LK and SK. Perhaps the most spec-
tacular example of a separatist doctrine is that 
of ethical realism, whose representatives argue 
that moral norms, values and in some cases 
morally good states of affairs exist regardless 
of the facts. The ‘good’, as George Edward 
Moore wants, cannot be defined in natural 
terms because good has nothing in common 
with natural properties; consequently, moral 
norms are not only impossible to be reduced 
Polish Law Review  www.polishlawreview.pl
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to facts, as would be wished by the advocates 
of radical naturalisation, but it is also impos-
sible to indicate any formal relation between 
scientific knowledge and morality[8].
In the philosophy of law it is difficult to have 
a similarly spectacular example of separatist 
view, perhaps because it is more difficult for 
the lawyer to ignore the facts (which is a very 
interesting fact in itself). At first sight, the phi-
losophy of law, which implies the doctrine of 
separation, is Kelsenian normativism. Hans 
Kelsen’s main thought is best expressed by the 
title of his opus magnum - the idea of creating 
a pure theory of law. What does it mean that 
law is supposed to be ‘pure’? Kelsen explains 
it as follows:
The purity of the theory or – amounting to the 
same thing – the independence of the law as 
an object of scientific cognition is what I am 
striving to secure, specifically in two direc-
tions. The purity of the theory is to be secured 
against the claims of a so-called ‘sociological’ 
point of view, which employs causal, scientific 
methods to appropriate the law as a part of 
natural reality. And it is to be secured against 
the natural law theory, which, by ignoring the 
fundamental referent found exclusively in the 
positive law, takes legal theory out of the realm 
of positive legal norms and into that of ethico-
political postulates[9].
Kelsen’s goal is to demonstrate that the law is 
independent of both natural law theories (axio-
logical considerations) and of sociological and 
psychological facts. To achieve it, the author 
of Reine Rechtslehre notes that the law should 
8Moore, G. E. (2004) Principia Ethica, Mineola, Nowy Jork. 
9Kelsen, H. (1911) Hauptprobleme der Staatslehre, Tübingen, 
p. 3–4. 
be understood as a system of ‘ideally existing 
norms’ belonging to the sphere of pure ‘ought’. 
Such understanding of the legal norm - and the 
related understanding of the legal obligation - 
makes the law applicable regardless of any so-
cial or psychological facts or moral standards. 
However, this ‘purity’ comes at a cost which is 
most easily seen by analysing Kelsen’s vision 
of the legal system. He believes that such a 
system is hierarchical: a norm superior in the 
hierarchy establishes the competence to is-
sue a lower-ranking norm. The closure of this 
dynamic system is the so called Basic Norm 
(Grundnorm). What is Grundnorm? It is difficult 
to answer this question given that Kelsen de-
scribes it as, among other things, the presup-
posed norm, presupposition, a norm included 
in a supposition, juristic hypothesis, ultimate 
hypothesis of positivism, ultimate ground 
of the validity of the legal system, thought 
norm, genuine fiction, judicio-logical constitu-
tion, constitution in the transcendental-logical 
sense, transcendental-logical concept, or tran-
scendental-logical condition of the interpreta-
tion in legal sciences[10]. These terms, though 
so numerous and different from each other, 
point to two characteristic features of the Ba-
sic Norm. First of all, it is an assumption or a 
hypothesis that allows to ‘close’ the system of 
law and separate it from other normative or-
ders. Secondly, this assumption is a fiction: 
Kelsen is aware that morality, economics or 
politics actually affect the shape of law, but 
emphasises that a lawyer - thinking as a law-
yer - should act as if the influence did not exist. 
He observes that such a strategy has nothing 
revolutionary in itself, and ‘merely makes con-
scious what most legal scientists do, at least 
unconsciously, when they understand [legal] 
facts not as causally determined, but instead 
10Bindreiter, U. (2001) Why Grundnorm?, Dordrecht, p. 17–18. 
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interpret their subjective meaning as objec-
tively valid norms, that is, as a normative legal 
order, without basing the validity of this order 
upon a higher, meta-legal norm, that is, upon 
a norm enacted by an authority superior to 
the legal authority (…). The theory of the Basic 
Norm is merely the result of an analysis of the 
procedure which a positivistic science of law 
has always applied[11].
So it would seem that Kelsen’s philosophy is 
an example of a vision in which the law has 
nothing - and cannot have - to do with facts, 
and therefore is not subject to - and cannot be 
subject to - naturalisation. In other words, hav-
ing assumed at the outset that law is an auton-
omous discipline, Kelsen claims that LK has no 
association with SK. This autonomy is possible 
at the price of certain fiction - assuming that a 
legal system is based on a purely conceived or 
‘fictional’ Basic Norm.
Things become complicated, however, when 
we consider Kelsen’s analysis of the relation-
ship between the concepts of validity and the 
efficacy of law. Here are the definitions of both 
concepts:
By ‘validity’ we mean the specific existence of 
norms. To say that a norm is valid, is to say that 
we assume its existence or – what amounts to 
the same thing – we assume that it has ‘binding 
force’ for those whose behaviour it regulates. 
Efficacy of law means that men actually be-
have as, according to the legal norms, they 
ought to behave, that the norms are actually 
applied and obeyed[12]
11Kelsen, H. (1967) Pure Theory of Law, Berkeley, p. 204–205. 
12Ibidem, p. 30, 39.
What is the relationship between the analysed 
phenomena? ‘Although validity and efficacy are 
two entirely different concepts“, Kelsen notes, 
‘there is nevertheless a very important relation-
ship between the two. A norm is considered to 
be valid only on the condition that it belongs to 
a system of norms, to an order which, on the 
whole, is efficacious. Thus, efficacy is a condi-
tion of validity; a condition, not the reason of 
validity. A norm is not valid because it is effica-
cious; it is valid if the order to which it belongs 
is, on the whole, efficacious[13]. 
Given the pivotal role of the Basic Norm in the 
structure of any legal system, Kelsen’s con-
ception pertains to the relationships between 
the the following three claims: 
(V) Legal order is valid. 
(N) The Basic Norm is valid. 
(E) The norms of the legal order are, by and 
large, efficacious, i.e. they are actually applied 
and observed.
What do these relations look like? Let us con-
sider the following interpretation.
Interpretation 1. Material implication. Let us 
consider whether the relationship between the 
validity and efficacy of law can be expressed 
by means of modal logic. The following sen-
tence seems to be a natural expression:
(1) □ (V➞E)
(we use the operator of necessity ‘□here to 
highlight that the relationship between validity 
13Kelsen, H. (1949) General Theory of Law and State, 
Cambridge, MA, p. 41–42. 
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and efficacy of the legal order is conceptual, 
i.e. it occurs in every possible world.) The sen-
tence (1) states that, necessarily, if the legal or-
der is valid, it is efficacious. In other words, it is 
not possible for a legal norm to be valid and in-
efficacious, but it is possible that some norms 
are efficacious (E is true) but no legal system 
exists (V is false). Kelsen explicitly allows this 
possibility when he writes that an absolutely 
efficacious norm can be considered invalid if 
it is not treated as a legal norm at all[14]. Let 
us note, however, that Kelsen also postulates 
the existence of a close connection between 
the validity of the assumed Basic Norm and the 
validity of the entire legal order, which is best 
encapsulated as: 
(2) □(N➞V)
(this formulation captures the intuition that 
the norms of the positive legal order are valid 
because the fundamental rule governing their 
creation, i.e. the Basic Norm, is valid.) How-
ever, if (1) and (2) obtain, the transitivity of the 
implication also yields:
(3) □(N➞E)
This formulation is problematic - Kelsen does 
not want to say that whenever the Basic Norm 
is valid, the legal order is efficacious (sentence 
(3)), although he clearly states that whenever the 
whole legal order is valid, it is also efficacious 
(sentence (1)). We are forced to conclude that our 
first interpretation does not properly reflect the 
conceptual relationships that Kelsen describes.
Interpretation 2. Presupposition. One may want 
to consider whether the efficacy of the legal 
system is not a presupposition of its validity:
14Ibidem, p. 39.
(4) V PRES E
The relation of presupposition between two 
sentences A and B occurs when a sentence A 
is meaningful (i.e. it can be attributed the value 
of truth or falsehood) only if its presupposition, 
a sentence B, is true. Thus, sentence (4) ex-
presses the idea that it is meaningful to speak 
of the validity of a legal order (V) only if the or-
der is, by and large, efficacious (E). However, 
the thesis (4) leads at the same time to the con-
clusion that the recognition of a legal order as 
invalid (¬V) requires that it was, by and large, 
efficacious (E), which is an outright nonsense. 
Thus, an attempt to interpret Kelsen’s concep-
tual scheme using the mechanisms of presup-
position turns out to be inadequate.
Interpretation 3. Defeasible implication. Yet 
another possibility of reconstructing Kelsen’s 
views is provided by the so called defeasible 
logic[15]. In this view, the relation between the 
validity of the Basic Norm and of the entire le-
gal order as well as the efficacy of this order 
can be expressed as:
(5) N�V 
(6) ¬E➞¬V 
Formula (5) uses the so called defeasible im-
plication which has a peculiar feature: it may 
be used to derive the consequent (V) from the 
antecedent (N) as long as no contradiction oc-
curs. In other words, sentence (5) states that if 
the Basic Norm is valid, one can assume that 
the legal order – as a whole – is valid. Formula 
(6), using material implication, states that if a 
legal order is not efficacious, it cannot be said 
15Prakken, H. (1997) Logical Tools for Modelling Legal Argument, 
Dordrecht.
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that it is valid. This formal reconstruction cap-
tures the following intuition: until we conclude 
on the basis of (6) that the legal order is in-
valid, we are entitled to say, using (5), that if 
the Basic Norm is valid, then the entire legal 
order is valid. It seems that this formalisation 
reflects Kelsen’s intentions well. On the one 
hand, the link between the validity of the Basic 
Norm and of the legal order is much stronger 
than between the validity of the order and its 
effectiveness: N is a constitutive condition of 
V, which cannot be said about E. On the other 
hand, formulas (5) and (6) do not force us to 
conclude that there is any logical link between 
the existence of the Basic Norm (N) and the ef-
ficacy of the legal system as a whole (E).
The adequacy of the formalisation with the 
use of defeasible logic shows at the same 
time a certain weakness of Kelsen’s concep-
tual scheme. Let us recall that by defending 
the autonomy of law against other spheres of 
cognition, he is obliged to postulate the exist-
ence of a certain fiction: a merely presupposed 
Basic Norm which is the reason for the validity 
(and therefore existence) of the legal order. It 
turns out, however, that even at the expense of 
fiction, a lawyer cannot completely escape the 
facts: a legal order that is inefficacious cannot 
be considered valid. Kelsen cannot, however, 
say that efficacy is a reason or a constitutive 
condition for law’s validity since in such a case 
it would be difficult to speak of any autonomy 
of law. The consequence of this is a compli-
cated construction in which efficacy, although 
influencing the recognition of the legal order as 
valid, performs a different function from Grund-
norm, which remains the sole foundation of the 
existence of law. This conception can, as we 
have seen, be formalised in defeasible logic.
The point is that defeasible logic is based on 
certain epistemological assumptions: it is a 
logic that allows the reconstruction of a cog-
nitive situation of an imperfect agent, i.e. one 
who does not have full access to information. 
Defeasible implication of the form ‘A�B’ is a 
useful tool because it allows to formalise the 
parts of human knowledge that are used to de-
rive conclusions, despite agent’s incomplete 
information. For example: one sometimes 
make arguments based on the conditional 
clause ‘If x is a bird, then x flies’, even though 
it is known that there are birds that cannot fly. 
The formal features of the defeasible implica-
tion show how such conclusions are possible 
but also make the ‘x flies’ conclusion open to 
defeat when it turns out that x is an ostrich 
or a penguin. Thus, the use of the defeasible 
implication is useful when our cognitive situ-
ation forces us to draw conclusions based on 
incomplete knowledge[16]. If A obtains, we can 
conclude that B, although we know that there 
may be (foreseeable or unforeseeable) excep-
tions that will force us to reject B. Thus, the use 
of a defeasible implication is meaningful when 
our cognitive situation forces us to make con-
clusions with incomplete knowledge of facts.
In the meantime, formula (5) N�V is neither 
open to unforeseeable exceptions nor de-
scribes the situation of an agent devoid of the 
full knowledge of facts. Kelsen explicitly points 
out that there is only one situation in which a 
legal order based on a valid Basic Norm can no 
longer be considered valid - it will be when that 
order, by and large, ceases to be efficacious. 
Accordingly, formalisation in defeasible logic, 
consisting of sentences (5) and (6), is pragmati-
cally equivalent to the following formalisation in 
the classical logic:
16Brożek, B. (2004) Defeasibility of Legal Reasoning, Kraków, 
chapter 1. 
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(7) (N�E) ➞ V
In this regard, both the validity of the Basic 
Norm and the efficacy of the legal order have 
the same status: they are necessary conditions 
for the validity of the entire legal order.
This analysis of Kelsen’s views on the relation-
ship between the validity and the efficacy of law 
is extremely instructive for anyone who would 
like to insist on separating normative and fac-
tual spheres. A lawyer cannot completely cut 
off the realm of facts but as Kelsen’s doctrine 
shows, it is difficult to imagine a partial isola-
tion. I do not want to say that this is certainly 
impossible because it is difficult to draw such 
conclusions based on one - although very 
characteristic - example. However, one may 
admit that the advocates of separation are con-
demned to the following dilemma: either they 
recognise the absolute independence of the 
normative sphere from the factual one which is 
a pure fiction, one very difficult to maintain, or 
they advocate for a partial autonomy of law, but 
then will probably be forced to recognise that 
the relationship between LK and SK is much 
stronger than they would like to admit.
3. Radical naturalisation
Radical naturalisation (or naive reductionism) 
is a view that legal knowledge (LK) is simply 
a part of scientific knowledge (SK); in other 
words, the relation between LK and (the cor-
responding part of) SK is material equivalence. 
Let us look at an example. In The Path of the 
Law Oliver Wendell Holmes argues that the law 
amounts to the prophecies of what the courts 
will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious[17].
17Holmes, O. W. (1897) The Path of the Law, Harvard Law 
Holmes wants to say that the statement that 
there is a legal obligation or a legal norm is 
equivalent to a certain prediction of the behav-
iours of the judge. In other words, a norm:
(N) Do not harm others. 
is equivalent to the statement:
(H) If x harms y, then the court will order x to 
redress the damage.
Another example is provided by Leon 
Petrażycki’s psychological theory, for whom 
the norm (N) is equivalent to the formulation:
(P) If x imagines that he causes damage to y, 
then x will experience an imperative-attributive 
emotion motivating x not to cause harm to y[18].
The sentences (H) and (P) belong to SK in the 
sense that the best way to formulate predictions 
of the behaviour of courts or the existence of 
certain emotions resulting from imagined situ-
ations is to use appropriate scientific methods.
The idea of radical naturalisation – or if we pre-
fer: naive reductionism - is subject to various 
objections. The first of these can be call the 
intuition-based argument and may be summa-
rised in the statement that - from the point of 
view of basic linguistic intuitions - (N) is neither 
equivalent to (H) nor to (P), and the recognition 
of such equivalence would lead to paradoxical 
consequences. This is illustrated by Herbert 
Hart’s criticism of the predictive theory of law 
Review, Vol. 457, No. 10, p. 393. 
18Petrażycki, L. (1985) Wstęp do nauki prawa i moralności, 
Warszawa. In both cases – Holmes’s and Petrażycki’s – the 
reconstructions proposed here are, of course, certain – not 
exaggerated – simplifications.
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presented in The Concept of Law:
If it were true that the statement that a person 
had an obligation meant that he was likely to 
suffer in the event of disobedience, it would be 
a contradiction to say that he had an obligation, 
e.g. to report for military service but that, owing 
to the fact that he had escaped from the juris-
diction, or had successfully bribed the police 
or the court, there was not the slightest chance 
of his being caught or made to suffer. In fact, 
there is no contradiction in saying this, and such 
statements are often made and understood[19].
The intuition-based argument, however, is not 
strong enough to result in the renunciation of 
radical naturalisation. The fact that equiva-
lences such as (N) � (H) or (N) � (P) are incom-
patible with our linguistic intuitions, or lead to 
the consequences that we perceive as para-
doxical, is precisely what the proponents of 
this method of naturalising law claim. Holmes 
and Petrażycki know how the law is perceived 
from the perspective of common sense, and it 
is with this understanding that they fight. The 
intuition-based argument may be enough for 
someone who, like Hart, seems to assume that 
the analysis of the functioning of ordinary lan-
guage can shed light on the nature of law or 
other social phenomena. But without this as-
sumption the intuition-based argument loses 
its force, and may even be counterproductive: 
for someone who is looking for a ‘scientific ba-
sis’ of law, a common sense approach to the 
problem is, by definition, a suspicious one.
The second argument against radical natu-
ralisation is the argument from the methodo-
logical schizophrenia. Let us return to the pre-
dictive theory of law. As Holmes observes, ‘if 
19Hart, H. (1994) The Concept of Law, 2nd ed., Oxford, p. 84. 
you want to know the law and nothing else, 
you must look at it as a bad man, who cares 
only for the material consequences which 
such knowledge enables him to predict.’[20] It 
turns out that reducing norms and legal obliga-
tions to predictions of court behaviour is not 
a purely theoretical manoeuvre but it has a 
purpose: only making these predictions as ac-
curate as possible will allow the ‘bad man’ to 
properly assess the consequences of his own 
actions[21]. But why is the ‘bad man’ concerned 
about these consequences? The only consist-
ent answer is that the ‘bad man’ is someone 
who always chooses the actions that will bring 
him the most benefit. In other words, such a 
person acts in an instrumentally rational way. 
The model of instrumental rationality can be 
understood in two ways: the descriptive (when 
we say that people actually behave as if they 
maximised their utility functions) or the nor-
mative (when we say they should behave like 
that). If Holmes’s ‘bad man’ was a normative 
model this would lead to a specific ‘methodo-
logical schizophrenia’ because we would ar-
gue that the norms and legal obligations are 
in fact predictions that are needed for the bad 
guy to behave as he should, i.e. in the way that 
brings him the most benefit. In other words, 
one would reduce legal duty to a description 
of some facts only to show how it is possible 
to fulfil another, extra-legal (prudential) duty. 
Of course, under such circumstances an ex-
planation would be needed what is it that dis-
tinguishes legal and prudential duties so that 
only the latter are genuine, while the former are 
‘facts in disguise’.
One can argue, however, that Holmes’s ‘bad 
20Holmes, O. W. The Path of the Law, p. 458. 
21Ibidem, p. 462.
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man’ simply acts in such a way as to max-
imise his utility function - the thesis that we 
always choose the actions that bring us the 
most benefit can simply be considered as a 
description of our actual behaviour. Thus, Hol-
mes could defend himself against the objec-
tion of methodological schizophrenia, noting 
that prudential duty - like the legal duty - can 
be reduced to facts. There is, however, a key 
aspect of Holmes’s theory in which this strat-
egy fails. ‘Even if it is plausible to think that 
a working attorney advising his client the Bad 
Man is trying to predict what a judge would 
decide, it seems ludicrous to suppose that this 
is what the judge himself is doing’[22]. Holmes 
indirectly recognises this difficulty when he 
says: ‘I think that the judges themselves have 
failed adequately to recognise their duty of 
weighing considerations of social advantage. 
The duty is inevitable, and the result of the of-
ten proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with 
such considerations is simply to leave the very 
ground and foundation of judgments inarticu-
late, and often unconscious’[23].
So Holmes unequivocally states that it is the 
duty of a judge to do such a thing which ben-
efits the public. One may wonder whether this 
obligation is legal or moral. However, there is 
no doubt that this is a duty that cannot be re-
duced to any prediction, which reinforces the 
allegation of the methodological schizophre-
nia. Holmes ought to clarify why some obliga-
tions (of the addressees of the law) are in fact 
‘hidden predictions,’ while others - such as the 
judicial duty to issue such rulings that maxim-
ise social utility - are genuine obligations, ir-
reducible to any facts.
22Haack S. (2005) Pragmatism. Where Does ‘The Path of the Law’ 
Lead Us?, American Journal of Jurisprudence, Vol. 50, p. 80. 
23Holmes, O. W. The Path of the Law, p. 72. 
It is worth mentioning that Petrażycki’s en-
counters similar difficulties when considering 
the role of the legislator. Petrażycki writes in 
this context:
‛The essence of the legal policy problems boils 
down to scientifically justified prediction of the 
effects of enacting legal provisions. Legal pol-
icy aims at developing such principles, which 
– introduced into the legal system or in some 
other way – would yield the required effects’[24].
Thus, it turns out that the legislator does not 
act like a mere mortal, motivated by emotions 
generated by certain imagined situations, but 
in an instrumentally rational way by setting 
goals and selecting the best means for their 
realisation[25]. Thus, the legislators’ actions 
cannot be described in a scheme that explains 
the behaviour of the addressees of law. This 
generates a different version of the methodo-
logical schizophrenia: legal duties are reduci-
ble to emotional states and motivational mech-
anisms, but the duties of the legislator have an 
altogether different nature, being independent 
of those states and mechanisms. 
More generally, the argument from methodo-
logical schizophrenia states that the reduction 
of norms and legal obligations to descriptions 
of certain facts is always only partial. Even if 
we determine the equivalence of such proposi-
tions as (N) and (H) as well as (N) and (P), then 
such a norm (legal or non-legal) must appear, 
which is irreducible to facts. In Holmes’s con-
ception it is a norm for the judges to maximise 
social utility, while in Petrażycki’s tradition it is 
24Kripke, S. (2007) Wittgenstein on Rules and Private
Language, Cambridge, Mass. 
25Motyka, K. (2007) Leon Petrażycki’s Challenge to Legal
Orthodoxy, Lublin, p. 48–49. 
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the rule of the instrumental rationality govern-
ing the actions of the legislator. In these cases 
we encounter a serious theoretical problem: 
why should one insist on reducing legal norms 
and obligations to the descriptions of certain 
facts, when ultimately one is forced to ac-
knowledge that certain norms and obligations 
are not subject to such reduction?
The defender of radical naturalisation facing 
this accusation has two solutions: either to ad-
mit that such a schizophrenic situation actually 
takes place, or to become a ‘heroic naturalist’ 
and to maintain that all norms and obligations - 
legal, moral, prudential, conventional, linguistic 
and other - ultimately are reducible to facts. In 
the first case, one may speak of ‘local natu-
ralisation“ only, which is possible in relation to 
some norms and obligations but not in rela-
tion to others. Such a position is theoretically 
flawed: what is the difference between law, 
morality and the social convention, or what is 
the difference between a person acting as a 
judge and the same person acting as a ‘normal 
addressee of law“, to justify double standards 
in explaining the nature of the normative? On 
the other hand, the second possibility which I 
call ‘heroic’, may be undermined with the argu-
ment from performative contradiction.
The argument from performative contradiction 
is directed at those who argue that there are no 
rules of conduct or duties, that they are all re-
ducible to facts. The proponents of this radical 
thesis usually take advantage of Saul Kripke’s 
interpretation of some passages from Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations[26]. 
This interpretation leads to scepticism towards 
rule-following: there is no such thing as rules of 
26Cf. Kripke, S. (2007) Wittgenstein on Rules and Private 
Language, Cambridge, Mass. 
conduct, duties or norms. The justification for 
this thesis is to be found in Wittgenstein’s rejec-
tion of three conceptions of rules understood as 
dispositions to act in some way, mental images 
and platonic objects[27]. Since rules cannot be 
said to belong to any of these three categories, 
it remains to admit that we speak of following 
rules or having various duties just because there 
is some convergence in social behaviour - for 
example, if someone does not keep their prom-
ise, incorrectly uses a linguistic expression or 
steals, they will encounter a more or less severe 
negative social reaction. In other words, there 
is no such thing as rules of conduct or duties, 
but from the perspective of the community, 
we can understand where the way of speaking 
comes from which suggests that we are acting 
in accordance with rules or in fulfilment of ob-
ligations. Kripke notes that the problem posed 
by Wittgenstein is similar to Hume’s analysis of 
causality. Hume argued that we have no basis 
for claiming the actual existence (or nonexist-
ence) of causal relationships, but our mental 
habit allows us to understand why we use the 
category of cause and effect. Hume is therefore 
a skeptic about the existence of causal relation-
ships, just as Wittgenstein is skeptical about the 
existence of rules.
Apart from the fact that Kripke’s interpretation 
does not necessarily correspond to the inten-
tions of Wittgenstein[28], it leads to far-reaching 
consequences. Susan Hurley concludes:
[I]t is not an adequate answer to say that the 
solution [to the problem of rule-following] prac-
tices provide is a skeptical one, that nothing 
underwrites content and we just, contingently, 
27Brożek, B. (2013) Rule Following.-From Imitation to the 
Normative Mind, Kraków, p. 27–33. 
28Ibidem, chapter 1.
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happen to agree in doing this rather than that. 
(…) [T]he full force of the skeptical view dis-
solves our capacities for intentional action, for 
trying and choice, however arbitrary, as much 
as for perception and thought. It takes the 
ground out from under the feet of pragmatism 
and conventionalism, as much as Platonism 
and psychologism. It rules out appeals by the 
skeptic to our intentional responses, our attribu-
tions, our constructions, our investigations, our 
procedures of verification or ratification, etc.[29].
Hurley points out, therefore, that the recogni-
tion that there are no rules, duties, and norma-
tive criteria leads to questioning the reality of 
a number of fundamental phenomena, such 
as intentional action, choice-making or justi-
fication. ‘Heroic skepticism’ towards rules is 
therefore extremely counterintuitive. Moreo-
ver, it seems also intrinsically contradictory, at 
least in performative sense. What does a he-
roic skeptic do? He argues that there are no 
rules of conduct. In other words, with the help 
of certain rules, he justifies a claim that no rules 
exist. This is a case of performative contradic-
tion: it does not obtain between sentences ut-
tered by the ‘heroic skeptic’, but between what 
he says and what he does.
Thus, proponents of radical naturalisation out 
of necessity fall into one of two pitfalls: either 
they must admit that naturalisation is possible 
only in relation to a part of what we commonly 
call the normative sphere (for example, law), 
while another part (for example, morality or 
rationality) remains immune to naturalistic re-
duction; or they must become heroic skeptics 
challenging the existence of any normative cri-
teria and standards, at the price of committing 
29Hurley, S. (2002) Consciousness in Action, Cambridge, Mass, 
p. 234.
a performative contradiction. I do not claim that 
this fact constitutes a final argument against 
radical naturalisation. After all, a supporter of 
such a view may say that he is content with the 
methodological schizophrenia, or that he does 
not understand why he would have to worry 
about performative contradictions. Such a de-
fence is, of course, permissible but it makes 
the concept of radical naturalisation indisput-
able and as such no longer an interesting theo-
retical option.
4. Moderate naturalisation
Moderate naturalisation (or refined reduction-
ism) is the conception according to which 
the relationship between SK and LK is not as 
strong as material equivalence; it can take the 
form of supervenience or a similar relation (we 
say that the set of properties A supervenes - 
in the global sense - on the set of properties 
B if and only if all possible worlds which are 
indistinguishable with relation to B are also in-
distinguishable in relation to A). The naturali-
sation project, understood in this way, can be 
found in Hart’s version of legal positivism. Let 
us recall the basic assumptions of Hart’s doc-
trine. Hart recognises that in order to speak of 
social rules one needs to take into account two 
points of view: internal and external. Here’s 
how he defines these terms:
[I]t is possible to be concerned with the rules, 
either merely as an observer who does not 
himself accept them, or as a member of the 
group which accepts and uses them as guides 
to conduct. We may call these respectively 
the ‘external’ and the ‘internal points of view’. 
Statements made from the external point of 
view may themselves be of different kinds. For 
the observer may, without accepting the rules 
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himself, assert that the group accepts the rules, 
and thus may from outside refer to the way in 
which they are concerned with them from the 
internal point of view. (…) Such an observer 
is content merely to record the regularities of 
observable behaviour in which conformity with 
the rules partly consists and those further reg-
ularities, in the form of the hostile reaction, re-
proofs, or punishments, with which deviations 
from the rules are met. After a time the external 
observer may, on the basis of the regularities 
observed, correlate deviation with hostile reac-
tion, and be able to predict with a fair measure 
of success, and to assess the chances that a 
deviation from the group’s normal behaviour 
will meet with hostile reaction or punishment. 
(…) If, however, the observer really keeps aus-
terely to this extreme external point of view 
and does not give any account of the manner 
in which members of the group who accept 
the rules view their own regular behaviour, his 
description of their life cannot be in terms of 
rules at all, and so not in the terms of the rule-
dependent notions of obligation or duty[30].
Hart argues, therefore, that a pattern of behav-
iour can be regarded as a social rule only if it 
‘passes the test’ of both external and internal 
points of view: it must be observed in principle, 
but also recognised as a standard of conduct 
in a given community. There are important in-
terpretative doubts as to how to understand 
Hart’s ‘internal point of view’[31]. In connection 
with this problem Hart notes:
The internal aspect of rules is often misrepre-
30Hart, H. L. A. The Concept of Law, p. 89. 
31Cf. Holton, R. (1998) Positivism and the Internal Point of 
View, Law and Philosophy, Vol. 17, p. 597–625; Shapiro, S. 
(2006) What is the Internal Point of View?, Faculty Scholarship 
Series, Paper 1336, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_ 
papers/1336. 
sented as a mere matter of ‘feelings’ in contrast 
to externally observable physical behaviour. 
(…) But such feelings are neither necessary nor 
sufficient for the existence of ‘binding’ rules. 
There is no contradiction in saying that people 
accept certain rules but experience no such 
feelings of compulsion. What is necessary is 
that there should be a critical reflective attitude 
to certain patterns of behaviour as a common 
standard, and that this should display itself in 
criticism (including self-criticism), demands 
for conformity, and in acknowledgements that 
such criticism and demands are justified, all of 
which find their characteristic expression in the 
normative terminology of ‘ought’, ‘must’, and 
‘should’, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’[32].
On the other hand, in the Postscript to The 
Concept of Law Hart notes:
Indeed, even the weaker condition that for the 
existence of a social rule it must only be the 
case that participants must believe that there 
are good moral grounds for conforming to it 
is far too strong as a general condition for the 
existence of social rules. For some rules may 
be accepted simply out of deference to tradi-
tion or the wish to identify with others or in 
the belief that society knows best what is to 
the advantage of individuals. These attitudes 
may coexist with a more or less vivid realisa-
tion that the rules are morally objectionable[33].
Therefore Hart seems to understand the ‘inter-
nal point of view’ very broadly. In particular, it 
is not true that the ‘internal’ acceptance of so-
cial rules must be of a moral nature - the basis 
of this acceptance may be the habit or other, 
32Hart, H. L. A. The Concept of Law, p. 85–86.
33Ibidem, p. 257.
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non-normative psychological phenomenon. 
So, in my opinion, I would attribute to Hart the 
following view: when one wants to know what 
social (including legal) norms exist, one must 
establish certain sociological and psychologi-
cal facts (i.e., in a given community there ac-
tually are behavioural patterns and they are 
considered by the members of the community 
as binding). Hart does not claim that social (in-
cluding legal) rules are fully reducible to facts 
(social and psychological), but he recognises 
the relationship between them. If these facts 
could not be established, there would be no 
reason to believe that the community in ques-
tion had any social (legal) rules. Social and 
psychological facts are not social norms, but if 
they do not change, the relevant social (legal) 
rules do not change as well. There is, therefore, 
a relation of supervenience (or a relation similar 
to it) between LK and SK. 
It is easy to see the difference between Hart’s 
and Kelsen’s visions of law in this perspective. 
For Hart, the change of relevant facts (social 
and psychological) leads to a change in the 
content of the legal system - if people (in par-
ticular, judges and civil servants) behave differ-
ently than before and recognise other patterns 
of conduct as binding, the legal system has a 
different shape; for Kelsen, the fact that a cer-
tain legal order (conceived regardless of how 
the addressees of the law behave and perceive 
their duties) ceases to be efficacious, it is not 
valid anymore (and hence ceases to exist).
More direct references to the idea of moderate 
naturalisation can be found in these contem-
porary approaches to law, which refer to the 
findings of evolutionary theory and cognitive 
science[34]. These conceptions assume that the 
34Załuski, W. (2009) Ewolucyjna filozofia prawa, Warszawa;
law (as well as morality and even culture tout 
court) is a product of evolution. It is difficult to 
escape such a conclusion if it is considered 
that normative systems and other cultural in-
ventions are ‘evolutionarily newborns’ – they 
appeared only a few thousand years ago, which 
in the scale of biological evolution is a period 
of neglect. It is generally accepted that the hu-
man capacity to create culture must be the re-
sult of relatively small biological adaptations, 
which have allowed humans to take advantage 
of the cumulative cultural evolution. For exam-
ple: Michael Tomasello claims that what differ-
entiates humans from other primates is rooted 
in their tendency to identify themselves with 
their own species. This tendency manifests it-
self in human mutualism: the innate inclination 
to help others, to cooperate with them and to 
behave in a way that is characteristic of one’s 
own social group. These motivational mecha-
nisms - along with appropriate cognitive abili-
ties - allow learning by imitation: people, unlike 
other primates, tend to take over patterns of 
behaviour from others. This, in turn, allows the 
spread of such patterns and their transmis-
sion from generation to generation. Tomasello 
calls it ‘the ratchet effect’: various patterns of 
behaviour, from tool use, through language, to 
social institutions, need not be ‘reinvented’ in 
every generation - imitation allows us to pass 
them on from generation to generation, lead-
ing to the accumulation of practical and theo-
retical knowledge[35].
The law, understood as a social institution 
whose purpose is to regulate human behaviour 
would be impossible without these biologi-
cal adaptations (i.e., the appropriate motiva-
Brożek, B. (2012) Normatywność prawa, Warszawa.
35Tomasello, M. (1999) Cultutral Origins of Human Cognition,
Cambridge, MA; idem (2009) Why We Cooperate, Cambridge, MA.
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tional and cognitive mechanisms leading to 
close identification with the representatives 
of one’s own species and learning by imita-
tion), but also without thousands of years of 
cultural evolution, which - by the accumula-
tion of a huge number of patterns of behaviour 
and ways of conceptualising the world - has 
provided the foundations for the functioning of 
modern, complex legal systems. The same can 
be said about other cultural products as well - 
science, cuisine, sport, etc.; they, too, like the 
law, are made possible by the human co-oper-
ative tendencies. All this shows that the thesis 
of the proponents of moderate naturalisation is 
in fact trivial, for - at least from the evolution-
ary perspective - all cultural products, includ-
ing law, are based on certain (sociological and 
psychological) facts. LK is in a certain relation 
(supervenience or similar) to SK because the 
whole of what we call culture is dependent on 
certain sociological and psychological facts, 
which are the product of the motivational and 
cognitive mechanisms deeply rooted in our 
evolutionary past.
I do not mean to say that Hart’s conception 
and similar theories are valueless - it is some-
times difficult to initially recognise the truth of 
what from ex post factum seems obvious or 
even trivial. However, it does not change the 
fact that the vision of moderate naturalisation, 
whose main thesis is that the law supervenes 
on regular social behaviour and mental atti-
tudes, is ‘almost’ tautological: in evolutionary 
terms, culture (including law) is, by definition, 
such a supervenient entity.
5. How to naturalise law?
In face of the problems identified above, it 
seems reasonable to look for a different con-
ception of the naturalisation of law, one that 
would enable a more precise account of the 
relationship between LK and SK. However, 
before I make an attempt to develop such a 
conception, let us have a look at three exam-
ples of the links between legal and scientific 
discourses. 
The first example concerns the evidence rea-
soning in a criminal trial. Let us compare two sit-
uations: in the first, we determine the presence 
of the accused on the crime scene by means 
of ordeals (for example, fire trials); in the sec-
ond, we use the DNA analysis of the biological 
traces (e.g., blood) left at the scene. Obviously, 
in the second situation the court proceedings 
are more consistent with the standards devel-
oped by science. Are we dealing here with the 
naturalisation of legal discourse? There are two 
types of questions that we face in every judicial 
proceeding: quaestiones facti and quaestiones 
iuris. The determination of facts is the subject 
of the evidence proceedings and should take 
advantage of the best knowledge available. 
On the other hand, quaestiones iuris pertain to 
the validity, meaning and the applicability of le-
gal norms, and make use of specific tools and 
forms of reasoning, different from the methods 
developed in the natural sciences. In other 
words, the fact that quaestiones facti are (or 
should be) settled according to scientific stand-
ards is not a manifestation of the naturalisation 
of law, since quaestiones iuris, which constitute 
the essence of legal thinking, lie outside of the 
limits of the scientific methods.
Let us look at another example. According to 
Article 58 of the Family and Guardianship Code, 
on divorce the court must determine custody 
over the minor common children of the spous-
es in accordance with the best interest of the 
child. The best interest of the child in the legal 
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dogmatic literature is understood in terms of 
the appropriate conditions of the child’s men-
tal and intellectual development. Let us imag-
ine that, when deciding on divorce, one court 
always gives exclusive custody to the mother 
of the child (sharing a dogmatic theory that 
the child’s welfare can only be secured by the 
mother); another court always points towards 
the parent who can provide the child with bet-
ter material conditions (referring to a dogmatic 
theory that binds the child’s welfare solely to 
his or her economic well-being); and the third 
court - to the parent who is able to provide a 
more harmonious emotional and intellectual 
development in accordance with the findings 
of the modern developmental psychology. Of 
course, it is the third court takes full advantage 
of the findings of contemporary science. How-
ever, it is a peculiar use of science, as it does 
not pertain to quaestiones facti, but rather to 
quaestiones iuris: the three courts differ in their 
interpretation of the expression ‘the best inter-
est of the child’. The interpretation of the pro-
vision of the Family and Guardianship Code 
adopted by the third court is more coherent 
with the findings of developmental psychology 
than the interpretation of the other two.
My third example is more abstract - it con-
cerns the fundamental conception of the civil 
law, i.e. the doctrine of the declaration of will 
(intent). Article 60 of the Civil Code defines 
the declaration of will as follows: ‘Subject to 
the exceptions provided for in the law, the will 
of a person performing a legal act may be ex-
pressed by any behaviour of that person which 
manifests his will sufficiently (…)’. This concise 
formulation is further explained in the civil law 
doctrine. According to the traditional view of 
the declaration of will: ‘... it is an outcome of 
a process in which two important stages can 
be distinguished. First: the stage of internal will 
formation. It starts with a motive, the idea of 
declaring an intent. Then there is the motiva-
tional phase, where the idea is properly veri-
fied, and when that happens, a decision, i.e. an 
act of internal will, is reached. After that only 
one element is needed for the successful dec-
laration of will, which is the manifestation of the 
will to the external world. This is yet another 
stage in the decision-making process, usually 
called the external will[36].
This legal-dogmatic description of decision-
making could easily be included in a mono-
graph on the history of psychology reporting 
how, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries (especially in the German tradition), the 
decision-making processes were imagined. 
The two basic components of this vision can 
be described as rationalism and voluntarism: 
it was thought that man was able to make a 
free and conscious decision in a purely rational 
manner. In other words, it was assumed that 
emotional factors do not in principle influence 
the decision-making processes. A completely 
different picture of those processes is drawn by 
contemporary psychology and neuroscience. 
It is believed today that the overwhelming ma-
jority of our daily decisions are unconscious 
and based on emotional mechanisms: through 
social training, supported by appropriate emo-
tions, we learn fast, unconscious responses 
to typical situations. Of course, we also make 
conscious, reasoned decisions, but this hap-
pens relatively rarely, in unusual situations[37]. 
Therefore, it turns out that the traditional theory 
of will is inconsistent with what the modern sci-
ence teaches about decision-making.
36Pyziak-Szafnicka, M. (2009), Kodeks cywilny. Część ogólna. 
Komentarz, Warszawa, p. 628.
37Cf. Brożek, B. RuleFollowing – From Imitation to the Normative 
Mind, chapter 2 and the literature quoted there. 
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The theory of will is, however, more instructive 
than suggested by the analysis of its original, 
historical form. The development of the twen-
tieth-century doctrinal conceptions of the 
declaration of will went towards the objecti-
fication of will. For example, the proponents 
of the so called theory of declaration believed 
that the goal of the interpretation of the dec-
laration of will was not to ‘establish the actual 
will’ but only what can be understood ‘within 
the limits of its expression and on the basis 
of all the accompanying circumstances’[38]. In 
turn, the proponents of the full objectivisation 
of will argue that by interpreting the declara-
tion of will one determines the meaning of 
the declaration, not the ‘actual’ will, where 
‘meaning’ is defined from the perspective of 
a ‘reasonable recipient’ of the declaration; the 
actual intentions of the person making the 
declaration are not sought after[39].
In the last decades, in addition to the ten-
dency for objectification, one can observe an-
other trend in civil law concerning the theory 
of will. In areas such as consumer law, one 
not only dispenses with the view of a purely 
rational agent, but also with the idea of the 
objectivisation of the declaration of will. It is 
instead assumed that the addressees of the 
law (consumers) often act unreasonably, un-
der the influence of emotional impulses, reck-
lessly and immaturely[40]. Consequently, they 
are granted special protection (for example, a 
38Grzybowski, S. (1974), in: System prawa cywilnego. Część 
ogólna, ed. Czachórski, W., Wrocław, p. 530. 
39Radwański, S. (1992), Wykładnia oświadczeń woli składanych 
indywidualnym adresatom, Warszawa, p. 20. 
40Such a conception was typical of German law. Recently, under 
the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 
there is a certain unification of consumer protection standards 
in the EU Member States, which in turn caused the departure of 
the ‘stupid consumer’ model.
right to withdraw from the contract or an ex-
tended guarantee). We are dealing here with 
a methodologically obscure situation. First, 
in many textbooks, commentaries, and court 
rulings, the traditional model of the declara-
tion of will, directly based on the nineteenth-
century psychology, is explicitly used. Second, 
doctrinal views objectifying the declaration of 
will distance themselves from any assump-
tion pertaining to the human decision-making 
processes, and focus on the understanding 
of a declaration of will by a ‘reasonable recipi-
ent’. Third, at least in certain branches of law 
and in certain jurisdictions, it is assumed that 
man often makes decisions in an impulsive 
and unreasonable manner. This incoherence 
is inconvenient for civil law, but - more im-
portantly - shows that lawmakers, judges and 
doctrinal scholars were forced to depart from 
the traditional model of the declaration of will, 
enriching it with ad hoc modifications such as 
the theory of declaration or the model of un-
reasonable consumer. Apparently the reality of 
legal practice has forced these modifications 
- the nineteenth-century vision of rationally 
and consciously acting agents has proved to 
be a failed extrapolation based on some rather 
atypical cases of decision-making. This shows 
that false assumptions pertaining to the ways 
in which the addressees of the law actually op-
erate may lead to the failure of legal institutions 
and the need for their continuous modification. 
Perhaps - although I am not going here beyond 
a very vague and speculative statement - the 
construction of a theory of will based on a 
more correct (and consistent with the findings 
of contemporary behavioural sciences) model 
of decision-making could contribute to greater 
coherence of the civil law conceptions.
The above examples - especially the second 
one - show clearly that the distinction between 
Polish Law Review  www.polishlawreview.pl
ORIGINAL ARTICLEOn the naturalisation of law
31
quaestiones facti and quaestiones iuris is an ar-
tificial one (although, it may be useful for many 
purposes, e.g. in the classroom). Legal institu-
tions, such as declaration of will - although nor-
mative in essence - are based on descriptive 
assumptions, which are elaborated in doctrinal 
theories and court rulings. To understand what 
a declaration of will is, it is not enough to read 
with understanding Article 60 of the Civil Code; 
we will not apply this rule without the appropri-
ate theoretical framework provided by the civil 
law doctrine in the form of the theory of will, the 
theory of declaration, or the conception of the 
objectification of will. The point is that these 
dogmatic theories are based on one or another 
descriptive view of the decision-making pro-
cesses. If so, one can ask if these theories are 
coherent with scientific knowledge.
But what does it mean that two theories, such 
as the dogmatic-legal conception of will and 
psychological or neurobiological view of deci-
sion-making, are mutually coherent or incoher-
ent? The extreme case of incoherence is, of 
course, contradiction. But one can also imagine 
two theories that are not mutually contradic-
tory, yet they are coherent in a minimal degree. 
Coherence is best defined as follows: a set of 
sentences (for example the sum of two theories 
as in our analysis) is incoherent if it is contra-
dictory; if it is (a) consistent, then the degree 
of its coherence increases with (b) the number 
of non-trivial inference relations within the set 
and (c) the degree of its unification. We say that 
there are non-trivial inferential relations between 
the sentences belonging to a given set if they 
can serve as premises in non-trivial deductive 
arguments; we also say that the set of sentenc-
es is more unified, when it cannot be divided 
into subsets without losing information[41]. To il-
41Cf. Bonjour, L. (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, 
lustrate the workings of this definition, it is suf-
ficient to note that a well-constructed axiomatic 
system (for example, of elementary arithmetic 
or geometry) is unified to a high degree since (a) 
it is consistent; (b) the axioms of such a system 
serve to derive new, non-trivial theorems; and 
(c) since the axioms are independent, it is not 
possible to divide such a system into subsets 
without losing information.
The presented definition of coherence (in the 
logical sense) allows one to formulate the fol-
lowing definition of the naturalisation of legal 
knowledge:
LK is naturalised to the extent that its descrip-
tive assumptions (in particular the descriptive 
assumptions of legal provisions formulated in 
legal doctrine and court rulings) are coherent 
in the logical sense with SK.
Thus understood, naturalisation of law is dif-
ferent from both the radical and the moderate 
views of naturalisation. First of all, the relation 
between (corresponding fragments) of LK and 
SK is not material equivalence, supervenience, 
or any similar relation - naturalisation is linked 
to the level of coherence between LK and SK. 
Second, naturalisation is a matter-of-degree: le-
gal knowledge may be more or less naturalised, 
depending on the extent to which it is coherent 
with scientific knowledge. A theory of will, which 
is based on the thesis that man always makes 
decisions in a conscious and rational way, is 
inconsistent with the findings of modern be-
havioural sciences, and hence non-naturalised. 
Theories that emphasise the full objectification 
of the declaration of will - distancing themselves 
from the assumptions pertaining to the human 
decision-making processes - are not inconsist-
Cambridge, Mass. 
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ent with scientific knowledge, but at the same 
time are unrelated to it; they are therefore mini-
mally coherent with science, and thus natural-
ised in a minimal way. Finally, if one constructed 
a theory of the declaration of will based on the 
assumption that humans usually make decisions 
unconsciously, with the use emotional mecha-
nisms, and only sometimes - under special cir-
cumstances - are capable of deciding in a purely 
rational way, such a theory would be coherent 
with SK to a high degree, and so the relevant 
fragment of LK would be strongly naturalised.
It seems that such an understanding of the 
naturalisation of law avoids the pitfalls of mod-
erate naturalisation. On the latter view, the law 
by definition is a ‘natural’ being as it, like other 
cultural products, supervenes on the regulari-
ties in social behaviour and mental attitudes. 
To know that there are legal rules, is also to 
know that there exist relevant sociological and 
psychological facts. Such knowledge is not, 
however, relevant in any direct way for legal 
practice. Meanwhile, in the concept of natu-
ralisation outlined in this essay, the question of 
the naturalisation of law is not a question of the 
way legal norms exist, but rather of the nature 
of the assumptions standing behind legal prac-
tice. This change in perspective is possible 
through the recognition that legal knowledge 
sensu stricto is not limited to the knowledge of 
legal provisions but includes dogmatic theories 
and court rulings which express, among other 
things, the descriptive assumptions of those 
provisions. This manoeuvre allows to define 
naturalisation using the logical concept of co-
herence, which in turn makes it a tool that can 
be useful in the process of creating, interpret-
ing and evaluating legal institutions.
Of course, a completely different question is 
whether the law should be naturalised. On the 
one hand, it seems that if we want the law to 
be effective, we should base it on solid de-
scriptive assumptions; on the other hand, 
history suggests that even counterfactual as-
sumptions can form the foundations of effec-
tive legal institutions. It is not clear whether 
the law which is largely naturalised is in some 
sense better than the non-naturalised one. 
However, this is a problem that goes beyond 
the framework of this essay.
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